|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions.|
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Names/Davidson: we can only know that "Valencia" refers to Valencia. - DummettVsDavidson: he confuses awareness of the reference with knowledge - the fact that the word has a reference object (at all) - Names/DummettVsDavidson: the subject must understand the meaning of the name: not that the name refers to something, but what it refers to.
Names/Kripke: meaning is not "the one who is generally thought to be the author of Waverley" - Dummett: knowing that (sentence is true): e.g. a child hears "postal strike in Milan" - but does not understand the proposition. - What is necessary for a proposition? - Certainly not knowledge about Ambrosius - Sentence: knowing-that "someone named Gustav Freytag was a lecturer in Wroclaw. - proposition, propositional knowledge: precisely the one who wrote Debit and Credit was a lecturer in Wroclaw - (description).
III 87 f
Names/Dummett: Standard explanation: Language use in community - actual baptism irrelevant, just like speaker, snatches of conversation - different: if only snatches of conversation, I must track speakers - Goedel: the concept of knowing-of-Gödel that he... has more substance than the concept of knowledge that "Goedel" is the name of the person who... - E.g. Goliath: confusion of the names, not the person - E.g. Obadiah (author, only action ((s) quasi "anonymous"): here confusion of persons, not the names, possible -
DummettVsCausal theory: just a theory about the sense of names, not one that replaces the sense with something else - it provides no explanation of the function of names in general.
E.g. hurricanes, constellations etc.- it is hard to prove that we named them wrongly - Causal theory does not explain the mechanisms of naming.
Dummett per description theory: verbal explanations of unfamiliar names help.
- - -
Wolf II 354
Meaning/Names/DummettVsFrege: (E.g. Dr. Lauben), the meaning cannot be basically subjective, because it is part of what is being communicated by the language - still Dummett considers the "sense" (subjective knowledge) to be part of the meaning.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982
K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993