|Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|I 84 et seq
Names/Chisholm: do not have "certain meaning" which would be an "identifying property of the bearer" - referential: not attributive: the content of "Emil stands" is in "stands", not in "Emil" - the listener does not have to connect a certain property with the name - when I say the name I want you to pick the object but I do not determine the way how you pick it (reference/intension) - but names are not without meaning, otherwise they could not denote.
1. primary: demonstrative meaning: relational, not property of the bearer - 2. secondary: use, also not property if the bearer, but self-attribution of the speaker: to use the normal use - "the thing meant by the name".
Meaning and reference of proper names are a function of the intentional state of the speaker.
"Loving Mary": is not a property, since the name has no fixed attributive meaning - solution: triangulation: relation of the picking out._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992
Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004