|Norvig I 621
Contradictions/AI research/Norvig/Russell: If human informants insist on contradictory preference judgments, there is nothing that automated agents can do to be consistent with them. Fortunately, preference judgments made by humans are often open to revision in the light of further consideration. Paradoxes like the Allais paradox are greatly reduced (but not eliminated) if the choices are explained better.
In work at the Harvard Business School on assessing the utility of money, Keeney and Raiffa (1976, p. 210)(1) found the following: “Subjects tend to be too risk-averse in the small and therefore . . . the fitted utility functions exhibit unacceptably large risk premiums for lotteries with a large spread. . . . Most of the subjects, however, can reconcile their inconsistencies and feel that they have learned an important lesson about how they want to behave. As a consequence, some subjects cancel their automobile collision insurance and take out more term insurance on their lives.” >Framing effect/Norvig, >Anchoring effect/Norvig, >Decisions/AI research, >Preferences/Norvig, >Rationality/AI research.
1. Keeney, R. L. and Raiffa, H. (1976). Decisions with Multiple Objectives: Preferences and Value Tradeoffs. Wiley._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Stuart J. Russell
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach Upper Saddle River, NJ 2010