Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Motifs: motifs are reasons for actions in conscious beings. Motifs can be conscious or unconscious, but their bearers must, in principle, be capable of conscious actions. Motifs can be stronger and less strong distinct._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. Ryle on Motives - Dictionary of Arguments
Danto II 323 Motive/Ryle/Danto: motives are not causes. Motivational explanations are law-like sentences. >Reason/Cause. AnscombeVsRyle: this is only possible for generalizations - a design for a one time lie would dispose one to constant lies. >Disposition. - - - Ryle I 110 ff Motive/Ryle: motives are not accompanied by feelings! They are dispostional, not causal and are to be recognized by regularity, lawlike - alien motives are recognizable as well as own motives. >Regularity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19