Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Possibility, philosophy: something is possible if it cannot be excluded. This has to be distinguished from the concept of contingency that expresses that something could have been different._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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W.V.O. Quine on Possibility - Dictionary of Arguments
I 423f Unrealized possibilities: e.g. the different kinds of possible hotels on the corner: no identity by localization - they are at most universals. III 259 Possibility/possible objects/actual/real/Quine: some are of the opinion that there are concrete individuals of two species: a) real (actual) b) unreal (not actual). QuineVs: this overpopulates the universe. (s) Problem: should one then say "not real Zerberus is real", or "the real Zerberus is not real"? For it would be too much to want to say "the unreal Zerberus is not real". At most, a representative could invoke that "not really Zerberus" is already a double. III 260 Not actual/Possibility/Quine: the trick here depends on the concept of the possible. QuineVs: but this is not possible for more complicated cases. Example "the round pyramid of Copilco": is completely impossible ((s) not updatable). Non-existence/possibility/meaning/significance/Quine: wrong solution: some authors think that a word for a completely impossible object is meaningless. Analogue: just as a logically unrealizable sentence is a non sentence, is not false but meaningless. ((s) (here sic, but otherwise mostly called senseless.) >Meaning/Quine. QuineVs: 1. this is unnatural. 2. it is also impractical. Then we no longer have a test procedure for significance, just as the quantifier logic has no decision procedure for universality and satisfiability. >Satisfaction/Quine. Solution/Quine: it is sufficient that words have the task of designating something. This is sufficient to express non-existence. The words have a full meaning. >Designation/Quine. VI 102 Necessity/Possibility/Quine: are intensional in that they do not conform to the substitutability of identity. Again fluctuating between de re and de dicto. >de re/Quine, >de dicto/Quine. VII (h) 148 Necessity/possibility/Quine: is not a general feature of the objects concerned but depends on the way of reference. >Necessity/Quine._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |
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> Counter arguments against Quine
> Counter arguments in relation to Possibility
