Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Possible World: entity that can be quantified over. There ist a dispute over the question whether possible worlds exist or are only assumed for purposes of proofs of completeness. See also actual world, modal logic, modal realism, realism, actualism, possibility, possibilia, quantification.
 
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II Preface (Putnam)
II IX
There are no "possible but not actual" worlds.
GoodmanVsFormalism: no formalism for the sake of formalism.
GoodmanVsImagination independent from our theorizing "ontological basement".
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II 78
We have become accustomed to see the real world as one of many possible. This needs to be corrected: all possible worlds are within the real.
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Putnam III 144
Versions/Goodman: it is not about different descriptions of "identical facts" - versions are unequal possible worlds, only incompatible versions must refer to different possible worlds - not different languages, so that tables sometimes as aggregates of time segments of molecules ... etc , but we decide to produce a corresponding world - E.g. "Big Dipper" was not created, but made a constellation. - PutnamsVsGoodman: to daring extrapolation: that there was nothing what we have not created.
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III 147
PutnamVsGoodman: "Big Dipper" is not analytical: if a star perishs, we would further speak of the Big Dipper - but "star" has properties that cannot be accounted for by specifying a list - not to know by that, that we find out what belongs to the Big Dipper.
Big Dipper: which stars are included, is rather answered by the linguist - PutnamVsGoodman: the term "constellation" is in the middle. - The constellation remains when all the stars are light bulbs - PutnamVsGoodman: easy answer: we have not brought about the star Sirius ourselves - we have not made it a star - we have brought about the term star, and this term applies to Sirius - our term of bachelor applies to "Joseph Ullian", without, however, that our language practice made him a bachelor. - We create the concepts, but we do not cause them to be true.

G I
N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

G II
N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

G III
N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

G IV
N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Possible Worlds



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29