Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

Home

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Models, philosophy, logic: A model is obtained when a logical formula provides true statements by inserting objects instead of the free variables. One problem is the exclusion of unintended models. See also model theory.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 164f
Models/Goodman: In many cases, a model is a copy or an individual case for which it is a model (e.g. model citizen). In other cases, the roles are reversed: what the model denotes that has as an individual case, for which it is model. A mathematical model is a formula that applies to the process. Ship model, architecture model, wooden model of a car: none is a description in the normal or the mathematical sense of the language. Unlike samples these models are denotative.
IV 165
Models of this type are in fact diagrams. Or: Diagrams are flat and static models. A molecular model of sticks and table tennis balls is digital. A working model of a windmill can be analog.
IV 165
E.g. The model house can also be a denotative model of houses under development including itself, and it exemplifies itself as a label. It differs from the miniature model as "monosyllabic" differs from "polysyllabic".
IV 165
Models are not, as it is often assumed, necessarily metaphorical. That depends on how it is steered by a prior use.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

G IV
N. Goodman
Catherine Z. Elgin
Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988
German Edition:
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

Goodman I
N. Goodman
Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978
German Edition:
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

Goodman II
N. Goodman
Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982
German Edition:
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

Goodman III
N. Goodman
Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976
German Edition:
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Models

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-02-25
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration