Dictionary of Arguments

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Modalities: modalities are in modal logic possibility, necessity and contingency.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
VII (a) 4
Modality/Quine: is limited to whole sentences.
- - -
VII (h) 143
Modality/QuineVsLewis, Cl.I./QuineVsStrict Implication: the concept of strict modality is based on the analyticity.
VII (h) 144
Modality/Quine: the contexts with "necessary" and "possible" are referentially opaque.
- - -
X 107
Modality/Modal Logic/Quine: Problem: extension-like (coextensive) predicates are no longer interchangeable salva veritate.
This is not a problem, but it complicates the logic.
X 109
Logical Truth/Modality/Modal Logic/Quine: the modalities here give more than the settings: we can get valid schemes here: example
"~(~p . notw p)"
In addition, we receive another schema from each valid one by prefixing "necessary" e.g. "necessary (p or ~p)" from "p or ~p".
X 126
Ontology/Quine: the real ontology is with the quantifiers of the standard language. The condition that this applies is very important.
If modalities or other constructions are allowed in addition to truth functions and quantifiers, they increase the strength and thus the content of the theories incomparably. > Strength of theories.
XI 175
Singular Term/modal logic/Follesdal/Lauener: a semantics of modalities must distinguish between singular terms on the one hand and general terms and sentences on the other hand: i.e. between expressions that have a reference and expressions that have an extension.
I 337
Logical modality has nothing to do with personal attitude. The modal logic as we know it begins with Clarence Lewis' "A survey of Symbolic Logic" in 1918. His interpretation of the necessity that Carnap later formulated even more sharply is as follows:
Def Necessity/Carnap: A sentence beginning with "it is necessary that" is true only if the rest of the sentence is analytical.
I 343
Church's system is different: he indirectly limits quantification by reinterpreting variables and other symbols in modal positions. For him (as for Frege) a sentence, to which a modal operator is superior, is a proposition. The operator is a predicate that is applied to the proposition.
I 422
Modality/Quine: the possible concrete objects, the unrealized possibilities represent another category of dubious objects. They can also be described as defective, because there is a complete lack of clarity as to identity, even more conspicuous than with intensions.
II 121
Empirical modaltities: (what could have happened): These modalities are not based on the nature of the world, but on the fact that we ourselves, e.g. through ignorance, refrain from details.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:
Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-22
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