Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Modal properties: are properties that are not attributed actually to an object, but are attributed in a possible world. A modal property is e.g. the property of being happier under other circumstances. The question is whether an object in the actual world must have a certain quality in order to have different properties in another world. See also modal logic, modal realism, possible worlds, centered worlds, contingency, possibility, necessity, properties, extensionality.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 111
Sum/mereology/Simons: assuming, we think of any portions of space-time as evidenced by any sums. - Then there is the question whether the relevant predicates are cumulative. - Definition cumulative predicate: if a sum exists, then the predicate which applies to it also applies to the whole, too. - (Whole unequal sum). - E.g. mass Termini can form any sums. - Non-cumulative: E.g. "is a human being" - The sum can occupy the same space-time as the corresponding individual, without being identical with it.
I 113
Sum/mereology: only exists because its parts exist. - ((S) So holistically an individual who exists only because other individuals exist.)
I 191
E.g. Tibbles/Wiggins: Thesis: the cat Tibbles is not identical with the sum Tib + Tail. Despite the permanent coincidence, because only Tibbles and not the sum has the modal property to continue to exist, if the tail gets lost.
I 266
Sum/identity conditions/Simons: sums have no autonomous identity conditions. - E.g. sum Tib + Tail is not identical with cat Tibbles, although it never loses its tail. - Modal property of the "could-get-lost" is critical - non-identity despite coincidence.
I 291
Sum/mereology/Simons: there are even sums across the categories (mixed-categorical sums): E.g. a body and the events that happened to him. - ((S) life story.)
I 354
Sum/mereology/Simons: here the structure does not matter.

Si I
P. Simons
Parts Oxford New York 1987

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28