Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Modal properties: are properties that are not attributed actually to an object, but are attributed in a possible world. A modal property is e.g. the property of being happier under other circumstances. The question is whether an object in the actual world must have a certain quality in order to have different properties in another world. See also modal logic, modal realism, possible worlds, centered worlds, contingency, possibility, necessity, properties, extensionality.
 
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I 189
Nature/essence/Kripke: E.g. Statue: The statue and the piece of clay are two items.
The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is the statue missing.
VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: E.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects?
E.g. Equally strange is it to say, a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules.
Intrinsic properties/Putnam: E.g. Supposing there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps in my brain a spacetime region with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects.
Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connections with other abstract entities that contain other external objects.
Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity.
Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain.
Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify him.
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I 190
Term/Possible World/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms - e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay" - PutnamVsPossible Worlds: Question: Is there in the actual world an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? - Possible worlds provide too many objects.
PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: its ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it - modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world - but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties - essential properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world - (other liquid than H20 water) - which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water - we just say water should not be anything else (intention) - that is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic) - (Kripke ditto) - VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference - (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship).

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

Pu II
H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

Pu III
H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

Pu IV
H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29