Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Metalanguage: metalanguage is the language in which linguistic forms, the meaning of expressions and sentences, the use of language, as well as the admissibility of formations, and the truth of statements are discussed. The language you refer to is called object language. A statement about the form, correctness, or truth of another statement thus includes both, i.e. object language and meta language. See also richness, truth-predicate, expressiveness, paradoxes, mention, use, quasi-reference, quotation, hierarchy, fixed points._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Ludwig Wittgenstein on Metalanguage - Dictionary of Arguments
Hintikka I 43 ff Philosophy/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: the thesis of language as a universal medium has as a consequence the idea of the universality of language. (Universal Language). Philosophical views do not enjoy the privilege of formulating in their own meta-language. As there is no metaphysics, there is no meta logic. The expression 'to understand a sentence' is also not meta logical, but an expression like any other. (Ms 110, 189). >Cf. >Metaphysics, >Universal language. I 44 Example: the case corresponds to that of the orthography, which also has to do with the word 'orthography'. >Self reference. Wittgenstein's philosophical technique is to ask again and again the question: On what occasion would someone express the sentence? This presupposes that a philosophical discussion is not one of the relevant opportunities. I 45 All metatheoretical and philosophical discourses are excluded from the study. Basic thesis of the universality of language. >Circular reasoning. I 47 Metalanguage/metatheory/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: there can be no metatheory, not even in mathematics. There are basically no higher levels - thus you can actually apply no semantic concept of truth in mathematics. >Levels, >Description levels, >Object language._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
W II L. Wittgenstein Wittgenstein’s Lectures 1930-32, from the notes of John King and Desmond Lee, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989 W III L. Wittgenstein The Blue and Brown Books (BB), Oxford 1958 German Edition: Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984 W IV L. Wittgenstein Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921. German Edition: Tractatus logico-philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960 Hintikka I Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka Investigating Wittgenstein German Edition: Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996 Hintikka II Jaakko Hintikka Merrill B. Hintikka The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989 |
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> Counter arguments against Wittgenstein
> Counter arguments in relation to Metalanguage
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16