|Metalanguage: metalanguage is the language in which linguistic forms, the meaning of expressions and sentences, the use of language, as well as the admissibility of formations, and the truth of statements are discussed. The language you refer to is called object language. A statement about the form, correctness, or truth of another statement thus includes both, i.e. object language and meta language. See also richness, truth-predicate, expressiveness, paradoxes, mention, use, quasi-reference, quotation, hierarchy, fixed points._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Metalanguage/ML/Interpretation/Truth Theory/KripkeVsWallace/VsBelnap: Metalanguage should not be purely formally construed as uninterpreted - (object language should).
Truth theory/Davidson//Kripke: meta language may contain semantic vocabulary as well - Translation is also guaranteed if both sides contain semantic vocabulary - Kripke: Very different in Tarski: truth and all semantic terms are explicitly defined in non-semantic vocabulary.
Modality/Metalanguage/Kripke: Modal operators disappear in the metalanguage - right side of a meaning theory/truth theory: no demonstratives, personal pronouns and no grammatical tenses - KripkeVsWallace: That does not make modal operators "misleading superficial properties".
Metalanguage/Kripke: If meta language = object language + truth predicate, sentences that contain no truth predicate must be treated the same in both languages - but metalanguage should have more anyway: Variables about expressions of the object language._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984