Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Measurements, philosophy: A) the problem of measuring is discussed in the context of interpretations of quantum mechanics. B) the comparison of D. Davidson's attribution of linguistic meanings to measurement is taken up in other theories._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
D. Davidson on Measurements - Dictionary of Arguments
I (b) 23 Propositional objects/Davidson: Thesis: attribution of propositional objects to other persons is analog to measuring. E.g. objects of wishes, beliefs, intentions. >Propositional attitudes, >Attribution, >Desire, >Beliefs, >Intentions, >Objects of belief, >Objects of thought. They have no causal forces and therefore they cannot affect our mind and our brain, or us at all. In what relation can we stand to them at all? These are the two tools that allow a finite vocabulary to cover infinite regions. Objects allow us to get adjectives under control. Events do the same for some adverbs. And when measuring, this task is fulfilled by the numbers. Now we can separate the semantic need for objects by which one can specify the content of propositions from the idea that there must be any objects at all with which someone who has a propositional attitude is in psychic contact. E.g.: weights of different objects: some weigh the same, some weigh twice as much, some nothing. The introduction of a scale does not change this. The only objects we need are the numbers and the things that have weight. With the statement: in Karat, the weight of the diamond is 109, we do not specify weights in the sense of objects. According to this, there is no alternative for the conceptions of doctrines as relational sentences. This "relativism", however, contains nothing that could show that the measured properties are not "real". I (b) 26 Measuring/Davidson: a scale does not alter the fact of weight or ratios - numbers are needed but do not belong to the object - ontology: weight is nothing objectual - analogy to measurement: attribution of intentional states - numbers: here only the proportions have to be preserved - however: if there is no contradiction between 0° Celsius and 32° Fahrenheit, this does not show that the measured properties are not "real"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Davidson I D. Davidson Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (a) Donald Davidson "Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (b) Donald Davidson "What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (c) Donald Davidson "Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (d) Donald Davidson "Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson I (e) Donald Davidson "The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54 In Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993 Davidson II Donald Davidson "Reply to Foster" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Davidson III D. Davidson Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980 German Edition: Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990 Davidson IV D. Davidson Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984 German Edition: Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990 Davidson V Donald Davidson "Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
||
> Counter arguments against Davidson
> Counter arguments in relation to Measurements
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19