Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mentalese: The language of thought, also sometimes called mentalese, is a language of which is assumed that it is used for information processing in the brain. It is supposed to differ from the everyday language, which would require a twofold translation. Critics argue that this makes the explanations more complicated, or the brain requires a higher work performance than necessary. The homunculus argument has become known against the language of thought.
Jerry Fodor. (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
H. PutnamVs Mentalese explains nothing, only shifts the problem. R. SearleVsFodor.
R. SearleVs Regress of homunculi (translation agents). Rorty's solution is a hierarchy of dumber homunculi._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Stephen Schiffer on Mentalese - Dictionary of Arguments
I 73 Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts). Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening. Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value. Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language. Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure. >Mental representation. Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought). Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought). Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content. SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled. I 76 Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? >Relation theory. Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular). Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states). >Mental states. I 282 Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language. >Convention, >Intention, >Everyday language. Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese. >Conceptual role. Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken. Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here. E.g. "state with the same content". Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought. Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief. >Objects of belief, >Content. I 78 Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g. "flounders snore". Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language. I 79 Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain. >Relation theory. Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions. >Propositions, >Quantification. Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C. Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case). Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog. Problem: only under optimal conditions. SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible. I 87 Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions. I 83-90 Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass. I 189 SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree with that. 2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula. Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification. E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy. Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional. N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano). E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + + >Knowing-how, >Nonfactualism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19