Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Mentalese: Mentalese is a language of which is assumed that it is used for information processing in the brain. It is supposed to differ from the everyday language, which would require a twofold translation. Critics argue that this makes the explanations simply complicated, or the brain requires a higher work performance than necessary. The homunculus argument has become known against the language of thought. J. Fodor Signal language of the brain for internal processing - H. PutnamVs Mentalese explains nothing, shifts the problem. R. SearleVs

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 491
Mentalese/language of the brain/Dennett: a unified "brain language" in which the information is stored in different human brains is very unlikely, but not absolutely impossible. - And therefore, brains are something completely different from chromosomes. ((s) Why? Because the language of the brain does not exist, or because it is conceivable?)
II 161
Intentionality/Mentalese/Dennett: E.g. ambiguous description (painter) what about the corresponding action?
The actions themselves have a meaning, because they are formulated in Mentalese! Dennett: this is a hopeless answer, not because it could not be found in the interior of the brain; you can find it!
It is hopeless, because it only shifts the problem. Because supposing that there is a language of thought, where would it take the meanings of its concepts from? And how do we know what its sentences mean in our language (Dennett like Searle, like Putnam).
Mentalese/Dennett: most of what was written about the possibility of a "language of thought" presupposes that we think in a written language of thought. (DennettVsMentalese).
II 69
Mentalese/DennettVsMentalese: shifts the problem (like Searle, like Putnam).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Dennett I
D. Dennett
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
German Edition:
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997

Dennett II
D. Dennett
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
German Edition:
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999

Dennett III
Daniel Dennett
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996

Dennett IV
Daniel Dennett
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-06-25
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