Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a spokeswoman to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 232
(to) mean/Grice/Tugendhat: the speaker who uses the sentence 'p', intendes to make the hearer believe 'p' is true - A intendes that B means that A means that p - (revised).
I 271
Definition (to) mean/Tugendhat: narrower form of believe: if the speaker does not have intentions that go beyond the outcome of this game - believe disposition is separable from it - one does not always mean p, if one believes that p - believe: has cause - (to) mean: can also have reasons except for causes - (to) mean: is not the expectation that p can be proved true - (because (to) mean is expectation anyway) - (to) mean = game intention (one can deceive the listener about it - believe/Tugendhat: also in animals.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

> Counter arguments against Tugendhat

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26