Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 232
(to) mean/Grice/Tugendhat: the speaker who uses the sentence 'p', intendes to make the hearer believe 'p' is true - A intendes that B means that A means that p - (revised).
I 271
Definition (to) mean/Tugendhat: narrower form of believe: if the speaker does not have intentions that go beyond the outcome of this game - believe disposition is separable from it - one does not always mean p, if one believes that p - believe: has cause - (to) mean: can also have reasons except for causes - (to) mean: is not the expectation that p can be proved true - (because (to) mean is expectation anyway) - (to) mean = game intention (one can deceive the listener about it - believe/Tugendhat: also in animals.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-29
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