Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Search  
 
To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
II 49
Meaning: is not primarily intentional, not without perceptible action.
---
II 203
Meaning/Searle: We define the meaning (and hence linguistic meaning) by intentional forms, which per se are not linguistic - philosophy of mind: analyzing semantic terms with deeper psychological terms > Grice.
---
II 204
Meaning/SearleVsGrice: Meaning shall be defined by action and intentional states - VsGrice: he used intent, belief and desire unanalyzedly - Searle: Meaning is a form of intentionality - like Grice: Meaning will be effective.


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


> Counter arguments against Searle



> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
 
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-29