|To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Mean: According to Kripke, Wittgenstein is not only convinced that no fact that affects me would make true that I meant something, but he also believed that this concept should not be explained with reference to truth conditions, but with respect to assertibility conditions. (>Assertibility).
Mean: The fact that I refer to addition when I say "plus" cannot consist in a fact that affects my behavior, my state of consciousness or my brain, because any such fact would have to bee finite, and could not have infinitely far-reaching normative consequences.
Mean: Which fact in the past caused that I meant addition with "plus"? Answer: none. If there was no such meaning in the past, it cannot exist in the present. Kripke: in the end, the ladder has to be thrown away.
NagelVsKripke: we cannot throw away this particular ladder. We would otherwise have no chance to formulate the arguments that lead to the paradoxical conclusion.
Nagel: some of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest a false picture. "that’s just the way I act" and "I follow the rule blindly." It will have to be the arithmetic judgment.
Def Mean/Peirce: opinion is the willingness to act according to it in relatively inconsequential matters (Weaker than belief)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982