Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 63ff
Mean: According to Kripke, Wittgenstein is not only convinced that no fact that affects me would make true that I meant something, but he also believed that this concept should not be explained with reference to truth conditions, but with respect to assertibility conditions. (>Assertibility/Nagel).
I 63ff
Mean: The fact that I refer to addition when I say "plus" cannot consist in a fact that affects my behavior, my state of consciousness or my brain, because any such fact would have to bee finite, and could not have infinitely far-reaching normative consequences.
I 63ff
Mean: Which fact in the past caused that I meant addition with "plus"? Answer: none. If there was no such meaning in the past, it cannot exist in the present. Kripke: in the end, the ladder has to be thrown away.
I 63ff
NagelVsKripke: we cannot throw away this particular ladder. We would otherwise have no chance to formulate the arguments that lead to the paradoxical conclusion.
I 73
Nagel: some of Wittgenstein’s remarks suggest a false picture. "that’s just the way I act" and "I follow the rule blindly." It will have to be the arithmetic judgment.
I 186
Def Mean/Peirce: opinion is the willingness to act according to it in relatively inconsequential matters (Weaker than belief).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

NagE I
E. Nagel
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979

Nagel I
Th. Nagel
The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997
German Edition:
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

Nagel II
Thomas Nagel
What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987
German Edition:
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

Nagel III
Thomas Nagel
The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980
German Edition:
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

NagelEr I
Ernest Nagel
Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-08-11
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