Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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Nagel I 63 ff
Meaning/Kripke/Nagel: Problem: The gap between the normative and non-normative. Meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers. Behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences. Therefore, these cannot consist in those.
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McGinn I 117 ff
McGinn: Irreducibility theory: Kripke: Intended sense should be an undefined fundamental part of the world while the semantic expressions in analytical terms are considered to be as fundamental as the basic concepts of geometry (Kripke).
Words and concepts are in a representational relationship to the world but it is impossible that an explanation would indicate what the relationship is and on what it depends on.
It is a simple fact that we mean things as we do because we digest and kick them.
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Wolf II 210
Meaning/Russell/KripkeVsDonnellan: It is about the fact that something is the only thing that fulfils the designation "the φ-er "ψ-s: ""φ(x) ∧ (y)(φ(y) > y = x)".
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Stegmüller IV 50
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Not a fact: even an "omniscient" being could not know what we mean - there is no fact of meaning -> Non-factualism - Important argument: the skeptical problem is not epistemic, it is ontologic - Vs "best explanation": it would also falsely recognize the problem as epistemic.

K I
S.A. Kripke
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

K III
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

McG I
C. McGinn
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996

McG II
C. McGinn
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001

K II siehe Wol I
U. Wolf (Hg)
Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27