Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments


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To mean, intending, philosophy: the intention of a speaker to refer to an object, a property of an object or a situation by means of her words, gestures or actions in a manner which is recognizable for others. From what is meant together with the situation, listeners should be able to recognize the meaning of the characters used.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 98
Meaning-that-principle/Chisholm: should be a reference to the meaning de dicto: accepted proposition or fact - e.g the vagabond means that Karl called the police (even if he did not know the name: ok - E.g. his school mates believed that the future pope would never become a clergyman).
I 100
(with respect to/(s): here: the speaker assigns meaning to a false object.)
I 156ff
Meaning (to mean) de re/Chisholm: of the greatest spy... problem: maybe there is none - two meanings: A) there is a thing, and the one who means identifies it as that to which he ascribes a property (broad conception) - B) The one who means identifies a particular thing as that of which he means something (narrow conception, still descriptive dependent).
I 163
Wide view: A: it is easy for the thing to be held for something (corresponds to indirect attribution).
Narrow view: B: it is difficult for the thing to be held for something by someone else.
I 169
Opinion de re/Chisholm: early, problem: cannot be explained de dicto, otherwise: e.g. because I know that the more valuable is the more valuable, I must choose both objects in the event of an error: 1. the one of which I believe it wrongly, 2. the right, because I believe of the more valuable ...- Chisholm late: solution: the thing is also identified as the thing of which the subject believes ...
II 128
Meaning (to mean)/Wittgenstein: no aiming at an object - no mental activity - paragraph § 689 - neither can the mental explain meaning and reference, nor vice versa. - A picture is as less related to an object from itself as a sentence - only the use makes it to do it.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Chisholm I
R. Chisholm
The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981
German Edition:
Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992

Chisholm II
Roderick Chisholm

Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986

Chisholm III
Roderick M. Chisholm
Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989
German Edition:
Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-12-14
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