Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Multi-valued logic: a logic that assumes more than the two classical truth values true and false. There are trivalent logics with possibility or indeterminacy as a third value. For tetravalent logics there are e.g. ¼ or ¾ as additional values that introduce a gradation in the rating. In the case of infinite-valued logics, the truth values can be interpreted as probability values.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
EMD II 108
Trivalent Logic: if B is false but A neither true nor false: then "If A is true then B is true" comes true, although "If A, then B " is not true! Reason: only because we assume, as it cannot be denied, that the sentence "A is true" is false if A is neither true nor false - new predicate for trivial axioms: "A is true": has the same truth value as A (not always true).
EMD II 121
Neither true nor false/Dummett: useful only for parts of sentences! -> multi-value logic - independently used sentences (not complex): for these only distinction between designated and not designated truth value important.
- - -
Dum III 27f
third truth value/indeterminate truth value/multi-valued logic/Dummett: "wit" (purpose) to be able to explain "not" truth-functionally. Truth table with w, f, X - difference: without truth value with conditional with a false antecedent: "X" (designated truth value) - for unicorn: "Y" (not designated truth value).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

> Counter arguments against Dummett

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-27