﻿ Willard Van Orman Quine on Ambiguity - Dictionary of Arguments

# Dictionary of Arguments

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 231
Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous, no general term but a singular term with dissemination - ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object).
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I 232
Truth is not ambiguous, but general: true confession as true as math. Law: difference between laws and confessions! - Also "existence" is not ambiguous.
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I 233
Circumstances/Quine: important with ambiguities.
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I 236
Ambiguities: "a" (can be "any") - "nothing", "nobody" are undetermined singular terms (E.g. Polyphemus).
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I 244
Scope ambiguous: cannot be decided by parentheses - undetermined singular term: a, any, every member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that ..." / "one is so that I think ... ".
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IX 184
Russell: "systematic (or type-wise) ambiguity/Russell: Solution for problem: relations: the type is only fixed when we state the type of things from the left end of the range and from the right end of the range - problem: the two-dimensionality can add up to growths: E.g. type of a relation of things of type m to things of type n: (m, n). - The type of a class of such relations should be called ((m, n)), then [((m,n))] is the type of a relation of such classes to such classes - orders were obviously even worse.
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IX 194
Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms/Quine: (context: polyvalent logic, 2nd order logic) Systematic ambiguity suppresses the indices, allows to stick to the simple quantifier logic. - a formula like "∃y∀x(xεy)", which is treated as a type-wise ambiguous, can simply be equated with the scheme ∃yn + 1 ∀xn (xn ∃yn + 1), where "n" is a schematic letter for any index. - Its universality is the schematic universality that it stands for any of a number of formulas: ∃y1 "x0 (x0 ε Y1), ∃y2 "x1(x1 ε y2) - and not the universality that consist in the fact that it is quantified undivided over an exhaustive universal class. - A formula is meaningless if it cannot be equipped with indices that comply with the theoretical terms.
Problem: then also the conjunction of two meaningful formulas can become meaningless - Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms: we can always reduce multiple variable types to a single one if we only take on suitable predicates. - "Universal variables" that we restrict to the appropriate predicate - "Tnx" expresses that x is of type n - old: "∀xnFxn" and "∃xnFxn" - new: "x(Tnx > Fx)", E.g.(Tnx u Fx).

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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Quine I
W.V.O. Quine
Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960
German Edition:
Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980

Quine II
W.V.O. Quine
Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986
German Edition:
Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985

Quine III
W.V.O. Quine
Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982
German Edition:
Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978

Quine V
W.V.O. Quine
The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974
German Edition:
Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989

Quine VI
W.V.O. Quine
Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992
German Edition:

Quine VII
W.V.O. Quine
From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953

Quine VII (a)
W. V. A. Quine
On what there is
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (b)
W. V. A. Quine
Two dogmas of empiricism
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (c)
W. V. A. Quine
The problem of meaning in linguistics
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (d)
W. V. A. Quine
Identity, ostension and hypostasis
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (e)
W. V. A. Quine
New foundations for mathematical logic
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (f)
W. V. A. Quine
Logic and the reification of universals
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (g)
W. V. A. Quine
Notes on the theory of reference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (h)
W. V. A. Quine
Reference and modality
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VII (i)
W. V. A. Quine
Meaning and existential inference
In
From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953

Quine VIII
W.V.O. Quine
Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939)
German Edition:
Bezeichnung und Referenz
In
Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982

Quine IX
W.V.O. Quine
Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963
German Edition:
Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967

Quine X
W.V.O. Quine
The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986
German Edition:
Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005

Quine XII
W.V.O. Quine
Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969
German Edition:
Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003

Quine XIII
Willard Van Orman Quine
Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987

> Counter arguments against Quine

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-18