## Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments | |||

| |||

Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

I 231 Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous, no general term but a singular term with dissemination - ambiguity action/habit: ice skaters, delivery (action, object). --- I 232 Truth is not ambiguous, but general: true confession as true as math. Law: difference between laws and confessions! - Also "existence" is not ambiguous. --- I 233 Circumstances/Quine: important with ambiguities. --- I 236 Ambiguities: "a" (can be "any") - "nothing", "nobody" are undetermined singular terms (E.g. Polyphemus). --- I 244 Scope ambiguous: cannot be decided by parentheses - undetermined singular term: a, any, every member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that ..." / "one is so that I think ... ". --- IX 184 Russell: "systematic (or type-wise) ambiguity/Russell: Solution for problem: relations: the type is only fixed when we state the type of things from the left end of the range and from the right end of the range - problem: the two-dimensionality can add up to growths: E.g. type of a relation of things of type m to things of type n: (m, n). - The type of a class of such relations should be called ((m, n)), then [((m,n))] is the type of a relation of such classes to such classes - orders were obviously even worse. --- IX 194 Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms/Quine: (context: polyvalent logic, 2nd order logic) Systematic ambiguity suppresses the indices, allows to stick to the simple quantifier logic. - a formula like "∃y∀x(xεy)", which is treated as a type-wise ambiguous, can simply be equated with the scheme ∃y ^{n + 1} ∀x^{n} (x^{n} ∃y^{n + 1}), where "n" is a schematic letter for any index. - Its universality is the schematic universality that it stands for any of a number of formulas: ∃y1 "x0 (x0 ε Y1), ∃y2 "x1(x1 ε y2) - and not the universality that consist in the fact that it is quantified undivided over an exhaustive universal class. - A formula is meaningless if it cannot be equipped with indices that comply with the theoretical terms.Problem: then also the conjunction of two meaningful formulas can become meaningless - Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms: we can always reduce multiple variable types to a single one if we only take on suitable predicates. - "Universal variables" that we restrict to the appropriate predicate - "T _{n}x" expresses that x is of type n - old: "∀x^{n}Fx^{n}" and "∃x^{n}Fx^{n}" - new: "x(T_{n}x > Fx)", E.g.(T_{n}x u Fx)._____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

> Counter arguments against **Quine**

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-07-20