## Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||

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I 231 Ambiguity: The name Paul is not ambiguous. It is not a general term but a singular term with dissemination. Ambiguity Action/Habit: are ice skaters, delivery (action, object). I 232 Truth is not ambiguous but general. A true confession is as true as math. Law: There is a difference between laws and confessions! Also, "existence" is not ambiguous. I 233 Circumstances/Quine: circumstances are important for ambiguities. I 236 Ambiguities: "a" (can be "any"). "Nothing" and "nobody" are undetermined singular terms (E.g. Polyphemus). I 244 An ambiguous scope cannot be decided by parentheses. Undetermined singular terms are: a, any, every member - "not a"/"not every" - "I think one is so that ..." / "one is so that I think ... ". IX 184 "Systematic (or type-wise) ambiguity/Russell: a solution for the problem are relations: the type is only fixed when we state the type of things from the left end of the range and from the right end of the range. There is one problem however: the two-dimensionality can add up to growths: E.g. type of a relation of things of type m to things of type n: (m, n). The type of a class of such relations should be called ((m, n)), then [((m,n))] is the type of a relation of such classes to such classes. Orders were obviously even worse. IX 194 Systematic Ambiguity/theoretical terms/Quine: (context: polyvalent logic, 2nd order logic) Systematic ambiguity suppresses the indices and allows to stick to the simple quantifier logic. A formula like "∃y∀x(xεy)", which is treated as a type-wise ambiguous, can simply be equated with the scheme ∃y ^{n + 1} ∀x^{n} (x^{n} ∃y^{n + 1}), where "n" is a schematic letter for any index. Its universality is the schematic universality that it stands for any of a number of formulas: ∃y1 "x0 (x0 ε Y1), ∃y2 "x1(x1 ε y2). It does not stand for the universality that consist in the fact that it is quantified undivided over an exhaustive universal class. A formula is meaningless if it cannot be equipped with indices that comply with the theoretical terms.Problem: then also the conjunction of two meaningful formulas can become meaningless. Systematic ambiguity/theoretical terms: we can always reduce multiple variable types to a single one if we only take on suitable predicates. "Universal variables" that we restrict to the appropriate predicate are: "T _{n}x" expresses that x is of type n. The old formulae: "∀x^{n}Fx^{n}" and "∃x^{n}Fx^{n}". New is: "x(T_{n}x > Fx)", e.g.(T_{n}x u Fx).>Indeterminacy/Quine. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference InFrom a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz InZur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 |

> Counter arguments against **Quine**

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-05-28