|Logical constants: logical constants are also called logical particles or connectives, they are e.g. “and”; “or”; “if”; “then”; “not”. The expression constant is used, because the meaning of the logical links cannot change also in the translation into other languages, but always remains. For example, if one was to try to replace "and" with "or" in the case of a translation, mistakes would arise which could be determined, even if the vocabulary of the foreign language is not entirely known._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Logical connectives/Deflationism/Field: a major advantage seems to be that it does not have to make this choice (between facts). Solution: one can easily explain in his own words what it means that "or" obeys the truth value table: It follows from the truth-functional logic, together with the logic of the disquotational truth-predicate, without mentioning of any facts about the usage. - "p" is true iff p follows with conceptual necessity by the cognitive equivalence of the right and left side. - Problem: Conceptual necessity is not sufficient to show that "or" obeys the truthValue table - we still need generalization.
Logical constants/indeterminacy/Field: E.g. a logic-beginner: nothing in his informal explanations will show whether he is an intuitionist or a representative of classical logic. - For example, the full use by people who only have one of two terms, most likely the term completely. The indeterminacy of logical constants is, however, from a non-disquotational point of view, more illuminating than from a disquotational._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980