Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Logic: logic is the doctrine of the admissibility or inadmissibility of relations between statements and thus the validity of the compositions of these statements. In particular, the question is whether conclusions can be obtained from certain presuppositions such as premises or antecedents. Logical formulas are not interpreted at first. Only the interpretation, i. e. the insertion of values, e.g. objects instead of the free variables, makes the question of their truth meaningful.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Hintikka I 138
Frege/logic/Hintikka: his logic is considered as the theory of complex sentences - Wittgenstein in contrast: easiest parts of the world - eliminate logical constants - They do not represent.
I 205
Logic/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: no other author than Wittgenstein has ever had the thought, in the logic it had ultimately no more explanation than what is given to us in experience through the simple objects - all phenomenology is just logic. - HusserlVs - Husserl: possibilities are motivated by background beliefs.
II 160
Logic/WittgensteinVsFrege: 1. It is rather arbitrary, what we call a sentence - therefore logic means something else in my opinion than in Frege's.
2. VsFrege: All words are equally important - Frege: thesis: "Word", "sentence", "world" are more important.
II 238
Logic/arbitrary/Wittgenstein: the rules of logic are insofar arbitrary that they can be eliminated for greater expressiveness - E.g. sentence of the excluded third (SaD) is invalid - at least "contradiction" is used in different meanings - as well as double negation -. Some authors: "the application is different."
WittgensteinVs: one cannot talk independently of a sign from its use. - ((S) Then it is another sign - against see below.
II 328
The sentence of the excluded third is universal.
II 327
Logic/Wittgenstein: it is not a science, but a calculus - in it you can make inventions, but no discoveries.
II 333
Logic/WittgensteinVsCarnap: one cannot construct a logic for all cases - because one cannot abstract both applications from the application.
VI 85
Logic/Tractatus/Wittgenstein/Schulte: not we express with the signs what we want - but in the logic the nature of the nature-necessary sign states itself - (6,124).
VI 89
Logic/border/Wittgenstein/Schulte: the logic is not given a limit through the use of the language, of course - it is, so to speak, the common framework of "my" and "your" language.
VI 118
Logic/Wittgenstein: say/show: logic says nothing, it shows something about necessity - grammatical sentences (about the language) thus fall out of the language game -> training: no speakable rules but blind following. TrainingVsExplanation, instead: Description - (> tell/show).
IV 101
Logic/Tractatus: (6.1264) each sentence of logic is a, in characters expressed, modus ponens - (And this cannot be expressed by one sentence). - (> Show/tell).

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

L. Wittgenstein
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989

L. Wittgenstein
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984

L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960

Hin I
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989

J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-27