## Dictionary of Arguments | |||

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Logic: logic is the doctrine of the admissibility or inadmissibility of relations between statements and thus the validity of the compositions of these statements. In particular, the question is whether conclusions can be obtained from certain presuppositions such as premises or antecedents. Logical formulas are not interpreted at first. Only the interpretation, i. e. the insertion of values, e.g. objects instead of the free variables, makes the question of their truth meaningful._____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
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I 34 Logic/Theory/Field: concepts such as negation, conjunction, implication do not require any theoretical access (like e.g. "light is electromagnetic radiation") - because they are logical concepts. --- I 73 Logic/mathematics/mathematical entities/m.e./VsField: one needs mathematical entities in logic, albeit not in science. FieldVsVs: this is a confusion of logic and meta-logic. - E.g. for definitions in model theory. --- I 74 In logic, which is simple reasoning, we need only the entities that occur in the premises, the intermediate steps, and the conclusions, but because we ultimately draw nominalistic conclusions, we need no mathematical entities in the conclusions. - We are talking about the predictions of empirical consequences. --- I 76 Definition Logic/Field: is the science of the possible. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 InTheories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-05-20