Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Leopold Löwenheim: Leopold Löwenheim (1878-1957) was a German mathematician who worked on mathematical logic. He is best known for the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem, which states that every first-order theory with an infinite model also has a countable model. See also Models, Model theory, Satisfaction, Satisfiability, Infinity, Countability, Real numbers, Numbers, Word meaning, Reference, Ambiguity._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Hartry Field on Loewenheim - Dictionary of Arguments
I 131 Löwenheim-Skolem/downward/Field: says that there must be no uncountable models for 1st order consistent theories. Compactness theorem/Löwenheim-Skolem/upward: says that each 1st order space-time theory, according to which there are infinitely many space-time points, will have models, in which the set of the space-time points is mightier than the set of real numbers. Problem: then the representation theorem does not apply. >Representation theorem._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |