Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Linguisticism: Linguisticism in philosophy is the view that many or all philosophical problems can be solved (or dissolved) by paying closer attention to language. See also Language, Linguistic turn, Analytic philosophy, Everyday language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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D.M. Armstrong on Linguisticism - Dictionary of Arguments
II (c) 104 Induction/ArmstrongVsMartin/VsPlace: as nominalists they can not accept an atomic higher level state, connecting the universals. >Universals, cf. >Nominalism. - - - Place III 107 Linguisticism/Place: Armstrong and Martin insinuate me to be too extreme. Solution: to accept that the objects of desire and those which are joined by counterfactual conditionals, do not exist and may never exist. Problem: that the quantification is not allowed over non-existent objects. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects, >Objects of belief. An intensional quantifier logic is not yet developed. ((s) Cf. >Intensional Logic/Hintikka). II 106 Language/object/Place: "I want an apple, I do not want a sentence to be true"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 |
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> Counter arguments against Armstrong
> Counter arguments in relation to Linguisticism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18