Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Leibniz’s Principle: Leibniz's law, or identity principle, states that if in the complete descriptions of objects exactly the same properties are attributed, we are concerned with the same object. In the case of identity, it is never a matter of two or more objects, but one, for which there are often different descriptions with different choice of words. Not every description is complete, so identity does not follow from each indistinguishability. See also identity, intensions, extensions, distinguishability, indistinguishability.
 
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I 127
Leibniz Principle/Identity/Cresswell: a) metaphysical (uncontroversial): indistinguishability - b) linguistically: substitutability - problem: in the context of reference: are descriptions real qualifying words? - Indefinite description: no one believes that it is referring - exception:
Epsilon Operator/Hilbert: εxF (x): "an x such that F (x)" - indefinite description: here the Leibniz-Principle does not apply.

Cr I
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988

Cr II
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984


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> Counter arguments in relation to Leibniz Principle



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26