|Leibniz’s Principle: Leibniz's law, or identity principle, states that if in the complete descriptions of objects exactly the same properties are attributed, we are concerned with the same object. In the case of identity, it is never a matter of two or more objects, but one, for which there are often different descriptions with different choice of words. Not every description is complete, so identity does not follow from each indistinguishability. See also identity, intensions, extensions, distinguishability, indistinguishability._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Leibniz Principle/Identity/Cresswell: a) metaphysical (uncontroversial): indistinguishability - b) linguistically: substitutability - problem: in the context of reference: are descriptions real qualifying words? - Indefinite description: no one believes that it is referring - exception:
Epsilon Operator/Hilbert: εxF (x): "an x such that F (x)" - indefinite description: here the Leibniz-Principle does not apply._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
M. J. Cresswell
Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988
M. J. Cresswell
Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984