Dictionary of Arguments

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Artificial intelligence: is the ability of artificial systems, to recognize patterns and redundancies, to replenish incomplete sequences, to re-formulate and solve problems, and to estimate probabilities. This is not an automation of human behavior. Rather, artificial systems are only used by humans to make decisions, when these systems have already made autonomous decisions. See also artificial consciousness, intelligence, consciousness.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
I 60
Artificial Intelligence/thesis: the mind acts to the brain like the program to hardware - different material structures can be mentally equivalent if they are different hardware versions of the same computer program - the brain is then not important for the mind.
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I 61
SearleVs: Chinese Room.
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I 227
Definition strong artificial intelligence/Searle: mind = program - Definition weak artificial intelligence: brain processes can be simulated with computers - Definition cognitivism: brain = computer.
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I 228
Artificial Intelligence: semantics is completely mirrored in syntax (proof theory) - SearleVs not to decide empirically what is: program, algorithm, computer? (description dependent).
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Perler/Wild I 145
"Strong artificial intelligence"/Searle: Expression of traditional dualism: that the specific neurobiology of the brain is not important.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Searle I
John R. Searle
The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992
German Edition:
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

Searle II
John R. Searle
Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983
German Edition:
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

Searle III
John R. Searle
The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995
German Edition:
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

Searle IV
John R. Searle
Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979
German Edition:
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

Searle V
John R. Searle
Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969
German Edition:
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Searle VII
John R. Searle
Behauptungen und Abweichungen
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle VIII
John R. Searle
Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Searle IX
John R. Searle
"Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-18
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