Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Artificial intelligence: is the ability of artificial systems, to recognize patterns and redundancies, to replenish incomplete sequences, to re-formulate and solve problems, and to estimate probabilities. This is not an automation of human behavior. Rather, artificial systems are only used by humans to make decisions, when these systems have already made autonomous decisions. See also artificial consciousness, intelligence, consciousness._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Artificial Intelligence - Dictionary of Arguments
I 60 Artificial Intelligence/AI/thesis: the mind acts to the brain like the program to hardware. Different material structures can be mentally equivalent if they are different hardware versions of the same computer program. The brain is then not important for the mind. This was one of the most exciting developments in the two thousand year history of materialism. The science of artificial intelligence offered an answer to the question: different material structures can be mentally equivalent if they are different hardware executions of the same computer program. AI thesis: the mind behaves to the brain as the program behaves to the hardware. One could be a materialist through and through and at the same time - like Descartes - be of the opinion that the brain is not really important for the mind. In this way one can indicate and understand the typical spiritual aspects of the mind without knowing how the brain functions. Even as a materialist one does not need to explore the brain to explore the mind. >Materialism as a concept, >positions of materialism. I 61 SearleVs: see >Chinese Room. VsArtificial Intelligence: objection of common sense: the computer model of the mind ignores decisive factors, such as consciousness and intentionality. I 227 Def Strong artificial intelligence/Searle: the mind is like a program. >Strong Artificial Intelligence. Def Weak artificial intelligence: brain processes can be simulated with computers. >Artificial Intelligence. Def Cognitivism: the brain is like a computer. >Computation, >Information processing/Psychology. I 228 Artificial Intelligence: semantics is completely mirrored in syntax (proof theory). SearleVs: It is not to decide empirically what is: program, algorithm, computer - that is description dependent. - - - Perler I 145 "Strong artificial intelligence"/Searle: expression of traditional dualism: that the specific neurobiology of the brain is not important. >Cognition/Searle, >SearleVsAI._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Perler I Dominik Perler Markus Wild Der Geist der Tiere Frankfurt 2005 |
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> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Artificial Intelligence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-20