|Criteria: do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true.|
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|Metzinger II 720
Criterion/Wittgenstein: good reasons for a hypothesis - not logically linked to the concept in question - only in the weaker sense of the language community - Symptom: empirical correlate to the criterion" behavior: not necessary for the presence of internal states - but for their attribution.
Criterion: can be behavior - but symptom: must be something physiological.
Metz II 720
Concept/Attribution Criteria/Wittgenstein: belong to the concept - E.g. pain: not only what it is in itself, but also function in our lives. - N.B.: then artificial intelligence is logically impossible for Wittgenstein, because we only attribute the concept to humans.
Hintikka I 262
Criterion/Criteria/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: middle period: rule and criterion come together here - the concept of the criterion becomes important in late Wittgenstein. - At the same time, the rules stand back - middle period: rule and criterion come together here. - N.B.: criteria are nothing more than conventions - e.g. that someone with a toothache cups his cheek. - They are the hard rock of the expression toothache. - I do not identify my sensations by criteria, though.
Hintikka I 266
Criterion/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: late: new meaning of criterion: the entire language game is the only criterion for the use of the word - the criterion depends on the language game. - Just as there is no independent calculus of language - "there is no criterion for pain" - new: therefore also no longer the conventional cheek-cupping when you have a toothache - rule-following is not based on criteria.
Late: behavior is not a criterion.
We do not detect whether someone made a slip of the tongue by rules, but this is a separate language game.
Belief/Criterion/Propositional Attitudes/Private Experiences/Wittgenstein/Hintikka: when Wittgenstein says: "an internal process requires external criteria", he does not refer to any internal processes or private experiences - but propositional attitudes such as beliefs, etc. - they need not be identified by a special feeling. - E.g. "I hope he'll come" is not a report on a state of mind - quite unlike sensations - different: "I always think of his coming": state of mind. - Propositional attitudes need criteria, because they do not include private experiences.
Understanding/Criterion/Wittgenstein: the criterion of understanding is that we can explain the sentence before we know whether it is true or false.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Th. Metzinger (Hrsg.)
Bewusstsein Paderborn 1996
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996