Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Criteria: Criteria do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Alfred Tarski on Criteria - Dictionary of Arguments
Horwich I 130 Truth criterion/criteria/Tarski: we will probably never find a critoron for truth. - But equally not for most other concepts including physics.(1) >Truth criterion, >Definition/criterion. 1. A. Tarski, The semantic Conceptions of Truth, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4, pp. 341-75 - - - Skirbekk I 177 Criterion of truth/Tarski: there is no tuth criterion that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory. ((s) The criterion cnnot be found in the sttements - these are different.) Tarski: Common feature of true propositions: truth, not a criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow.(2) Cf. >Truth/Quine. 2. A.Tarski, „Die semantische Konzeption der Wahrheit und die Grundlagen der Semantik“ (1944) in: G. Skirbekk (ed.) Wahrheitstheorien, Frankfurt 1996 - - - Berka I 492 Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong. That works in the class calculus. A structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite. ((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide). >general criterion of truth. >Definitions/Tarski, >Correctness, >Provability. I 502 Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from §3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope. >Term scope. Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals).(3) >Semantic categories. 3. A.Tarski, Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen, Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum. Vol 1, Lemberg 1935_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Tarski I A. Tarski Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Skirbekk I G. Skirbekk (Hg) Wahrheitstheorien In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt 1977 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16