|Criteria: do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true.|
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|Horwich I 130
Truth criterion / Criterion / Tarski: we will probably never find one - but equally not for most other concepts including the physics.
Tarski I 177
Criterion of truth / Tarski: there is none that shows that there is no wrong record of an empirical theory - ((s) somewhere: criterion not included in the statements themselves - these are all different.) - Tarksi: Commonality of true propositions: truth, not criterion as blackness of the coal and whiteness of the snow - ((s) Arithmetic: the criterion is in the rules here.)
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Berka I 492
Truth/criterion/structural/Tarski: a structural truth-criterion allows each statement of the language to effectively allocate a statement that is equivalent to them, which, if it is not quantitative, is obviously true or obviously wrong - that works in the class calculus - a structural characteristic of true statements possible if it can be shown that the class of individuals is infinite. - ((s) Because then accuracy/provability coincide). -> general criterion of truth.
Criterion of truth/structural/Tarski: is given to us in that we find that the concept of the true statement (from §3) and the one of the provable theorem (due to the matrix method) are of the same scope - Problem: this is only true for simple languages - (i.e. with only a single semantic category E.g. only individuals).
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics: Papers from 1923-38 Indianapolis 1983
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994
K. Berka/L. Kreiser
Logik Texte Berlin 1983