|Criteria: do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon:
Criteria/Rorty: the search for criteria is the search for a hidden nature.
Horwich I 447
Criterion of truth/idealism/Rorty: coherence.
Criterion/Justification/Rorty: E.g. criteria-less justification: Democracy/Churchill: is the worst form that you can imagine, except for all the others that have been tried - ((s) List instead of criteria.)
Criterion: justification is a criterion for truth - truth/Rorty: undefinable. (like Davidson).
Criterion/Criteria/Rorty: our criteria are determined by our purposes - not by nature - nature is not divided into inputs._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
P. Horwich (Ed.)
Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994