Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Criteria: do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Cavell I 275
Criteria/Wittgenstein/Cavell: Wittgenstein's criteria do not help to distinguish between genuine and feigned pain. (Only for signs of pain).
Putnam: but they allow me to realize that what I seem to see is a case of pain.
They do not say: the pain is real, but they tell me that I see pain.
Criteria/Behaviorism/Wittgenstein/Cavell/Putnam: If I answer the skeptic, I know that the criteria are fulfilled, because the criteria are determined by the behavior, then my (Putnam's) interpretation Wittgenstein's approaches so much a behaviorist one that I would be forced to call Wittgenstein a behaviourist.
Cavell: we cannot describe the criteria for pain without using the concept of pain.
Putnam: for Cavell, who does not see the function of criteria in granting the permission; to say "I know", the path to a behaviorist Wittgenstein does not open up at all.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

Cav I
St. Cavell
Die Unheimlichkeit des Gewöhnlichen Frankfurt 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25