Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Criteria: Criteria do not follow from a definition but must be developed. The criteria for the application of a concept to an object are more concerned with language practice in a community. E.g. the definition of truth does not provide a criterion for which sentences are true._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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R. Chisholm on Criteria - Dictionary of Arguments
II 3-15 Criterion/David: the criterion e.g. for good/bad apples is not itself an apple, but for propositions it is a proposition. ChisholmVs: it does not have to be a proposition. Epistemology: A: what do we know? B: how do we decide whether we know anything? Parikularism: from A to B Methodism: from B to A Criteria: need not be explicit knowledge. Vs: circular if the criterion relies on the list A. VsVs: need not be a finished list. - Actual argue whether a complete theory must be at the beginning. No one can start with single examples, but: Methodism: solution: the good apples are the ones that have no stains - and thus A and B fall together. Particularism: in better position: just start, we do not need a principle. >Method, >Theories, >Verification, >Observation, >Confirmation, >Measurements. David, Marian. Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common sense. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-17