|Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: no behavior allows us to infer internal rules (in the past) about addition, so there are no rules about meaning, not in the present, therefore, not about truth.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Vs: the skeptical thought confused mention and use by concluding that all that is true of meanings, also applies to truth. See also >Private Language, >Rule Following, >Quaddition._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge 1992
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001
"Language-Mastery and Sorites Paradox"
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Georg Henrik von Wright
Explanation and Understanding, New York 1971
Erklären und Verstehen Hamburg 2008