Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs.
 
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Books on Amazon
I 264ff
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Kripkenstein: no behavior allows us to infer internal rules (in the past) about addition, so there are no rules about meaning, not in the present, therefore, not about truth.
I 269
Kripke’s Wittgenstein: Vs: the skeptical thought confused mention and use by concluding that all that is true of meanings, also applies to truth.

Wri I
Cr. Wright
Wahrheit und Objektivität Frankfurt 2001


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-28