|Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Belief/Meaning/Fact/Nonfactualism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: there is simply no property that is equivalent to the meaningful predicate "believes that Harvard lies not in Miami", and there is not a fact, that corresponds to the closed sentence that contains the predicate. - Quaddition: for the past, there was not a fact, and a fortiori not for the present. - Problem: it is not true that he meant addition instead of Quaddition. - Solution: - "fact" is ambiguous: pleonastic and non-pleonastic.
Nonfactualism/Solution: there is no (non-pleonastic) property which is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. - Direct solution: physicalist reduction - this is impossible when it is abpout meaning (intending). See also >Private Language, >Rule Following._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987