Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 174
Belief/Meaning/Fact/Nonfactualism/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Schiffer: there is simply no property that is equivalent to the meaningful predicate "believes that Harvard lies not in Miami", and there is not a fact, that corresponds to the closed sentence that contains the predicate. - Quaddition: for the past, there was not a fact, and a fortiori not for the present. - Problem: it is not true that he meant addition instead of Quaddition. - Solution: - "fact" is ambiguous: pleonastic and non-pleonastic.
I 176
Nonfactualism/Solution: there is no (non-pleonastic) property which is ontologically or conceptually separated from the predicate and expressed by it. - Direct solution: physicalist reduction - this is impossible when it is abpout meaning (intending).

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987

> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Kripke’s Wittgenstein

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27