|Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Kripke’s Wittgenstein/NagelVsKripke: Kripke is more reductionist than Wittgenstein would have wished - "it’s not about (naturalistic) facts from the past.
Solution/Nagel: there are no alternative meanings. - Nagel: but we are still using our language; even in the attempt to assert its impossibility.
It is possible that some of my words mean nothing, but in order to detect that I have to use other words properly.
Mean/Kripke/Kripke’s Wittgenstein/Nagel: problem: the gap between the non-normative and normative. The act of meaning implies the difference between right and wrong answers - behavior, beliefs, dispositional or experience-based facts imply no such consequences - therefore these cannot consist in them.
Kripke’s Wittgenstein/StrawsonVsKripkeNagel: we understand the language well enough to recognize when inconsistencies are attributable solely to the sense or to the meaning._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991
The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979