|Kripke's Wittgenstein: Interpretation by Saul A. Kripke of a problem by L. Wittgenstein in connection with the rule series. Kripke extends Wittgenstein's doubts about the security with which we judge our own opinion. If we only believe to follow rules, we do not know for sure what we mean by addition. From a finite series of cases in the past, no certainty about future cases can be gained. The core of the problem is, according to Kripke, that there are no facts that determine the importance of our own beliefs.|
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Kripke's Wittgenstein: each finite row of examples satisfies an infinite number of possible logical rules - Kripke does not proceed from behavior, but from intention: how do you know yourself that one should say 125, if one intends to act in accordance with one's previous answers? - There's nothing mental, which determines the content - with infinite possibilities there is no conceptual content - but term independent of certain application
Kripke's Wittgenstein: dispositions/Kripke: do not help because they are also limited - why would the act that you are dispositional for be the one that should be done? - Form/KripkeVsAristoteles: same problem: how can one recognize the right "natural characteristics" (normativity problem)?
Kripke's Wittgenstein/skeptical solution: results only in assertibility conditions, no truth conditions: thus no facts which make statements about meaning come true - Esfeld: solution: social practice, middle way between skeptical solution (nonfactualism) and direct solution: which tries to find the facts of meaning in the equipment of the world - KripkeVs: one could have addition today and yesterday quaddition:. whatever appears correctly in the moment, is correct - current dispositions have always privileged position - change not independet from conceptual content: to determine change, this must be established first
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002