Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Conceptualism, philosophy: the thesis that concepts are constructions of the human mind and, for their part, have no real existence. This also denies the existence of universals. They exist at most as divisions, but not as ideas. See also nominalism, conceptual realism, platonism, universals, ideas.
 
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I 72f
Veritative being/Tugendhat: "it is the case that p" (>facts?) - VsObject Theory - VsConceptualism (concepts for objects) - immaterial - but also VsImagination - instead: Language as a basic constitution (yes/no structure) - TugendhatVsMiddle Ages: verum as "transcendental" determination of ens next to unum and aliquid - had Aristotle referred to the veritative existence, he could have created a semantics of assertion.
I 91
VsHeidegger: existence of facts instead of "all being is being of beings"
I 184f
Def Conceptualism/Tugendhat: the theory that predicate = concept (conceptus). The predicate stands for something, otherwise the use of the predicate would have no objective basis - I 185 Nominalism: denies that we actually always imagine something when we use a predicate sensibly. We can also understand the sentence about the red castle without having a concrete idea.
NominalismVsConceptualism: misunderstanding: the imagination does not have to be sensual - NominalismVsConceptualism: there are no "general images" - or images of something general - characterization only exists since Wittgsteins Philosophical Inveistigations.-
I 189
VsConceptualism: object dispensable - Nominalism: 1) linguistic sign belongs to the intersubjective understanding-each-other - then intra-subjective understanding superfluous? - 2) results in positive explanation for inter-subjective meaning.
I 204
Conceptualism/Tugendhat: must postulate nonsensual imagination, because no sensual imagination corresponds to "every color".

Tu I
E. Tugendhat
Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976

Tu II
E. Tugendhat
Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992


> Counter arguments against Tugendhat
> Counter arguments in relation to Conceptualism



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25