Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Contingency, philosophy: Contingency is not synonymous with randomness, but expresses that an existing fact could have been different. Its counterpart is necessity. See also coincidence, necessity, necessity de re.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
Stalnaker I 188
Contingent a priori/Kripke/Stalnaker: Evans: e.g. the inventor of the zipper (whoever he/she is) is assumed to be called Julius (by stipulation) - then the statement "Julius invented the zipper" can be known a priori - Reference/Meaning/Important Argument: because the description was rather used to determine the reference than to give the meaning, the fact that Julius invented the zipper is a contingent fact.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Kripke I
S.A. Kripke
Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972
German Edition:
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981

Kripke II
Saul A. Kripke
"Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276
In
Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993

Kripke III
Saul A. Kripke
Is there a problem with substitutional quantification?
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976

Kripke IV
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
In
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984

Stalnaker I
R. Stalnaker
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-01-23
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