|Context, context dependency: sentences, words and texts depend to a varying extent on the addition of additional information to eliminate ambiguities. In particular, the use of index words such as "here", "now", but also of pronouns like "mine" leads to indeterminacy of the reference. The additional information may possibly be taken from an already existing information set, whereby the sentences to be examined, words or texts, form a subset of this more comprehensive set. Such a more comprehensive amount of information already existing elsewhere is called context. See also dependency, ambiguity, indeterminacy, discovery._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
|Nozick II 220
Mental terms/context/Wittgenstein/philosophical examinations/Nozick: the application of mental concepts depends on what else is true, for example, in the case of understanding or reading - behavior does not imply (entails) the presence of a particular mental state. There could be another (wider) context which shows that the person was not in the nearby state. - Similarly the feeling of understanding produces no understanding, if it is not embedded into a wider context.
Context principle: Only the sentence has sense, only in the context of the sentence a name has a meaning.
Meaning/Wittgenstein: if one has given the term "an x in the infinite development" in a context a meaning, so one has not necessarily given it a meaning in all contexts._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994