## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

Constructivism, philosophy: the thesis that the objects of the external world, together with their properties and relations are constructed by the brain to other objects and their relations to us. Constructivist styles are differently strong in their assumptions about the existence and recognizability of an objective, independent reality. See also Autopoiesis, system theory, Luhmann, Maturana. | |||

Author | Item | Excerpt | Meta data |
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Books on Amazon: Bertrand Russell |
I XX Constructivist attitude/Constructivism/Russell/Gödel: was abandoned in the first edition, since the reducibility axiom for higher types makes it necessary that basic predicates of infinitely high type exist - of constructivism only remains 1) Classes as facon de parler 2). The definition of ~, v, etc. as valid for propositions that contain quantifiers 3) Gradual construction of functions of orders higher than 1 (superfluous of course, because of the reducibility-axiom) 4) Interpretation of definitions as mere typographical shortcuts. GoedelVs: because of reducibility axiom: there always exist real objects in the form of basic predicates corresponding to each defined symbol. I XX Constructivist attitude/Constructivism/Principia Mathematica/Gödel: is taken in again in the second edition and the reducibility axiom is dropped. - It is determined that all basic predicates belong to the lowest type. |
R I B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986 R II B. Russell Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989 R IV B. Russell Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967 R VI B. Russell Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus InEigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993 R VII B. Russell Wahrheit und Falschheit InWahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 |

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> Counter arguments in relation to **Constructivism**

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23