Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Compositionality, linguistics, language philosophy: the thesis (originally by G. Frege) that the meaning of composite expressions, e.g. sentences, results from the meanings of the parts. It follows that a change of the parts, e.g. replacement of a single word by another, can change the meaning of the entire composite structure. See also Frege principle.
 
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I XVIII
SchifferVsCompositionality: we must reject it because we must also reject the theory of relation (without which we cannot have the compositionality) - understanding must be explained otherwise: Solution: conceptual role in neuronal lingua mentis without compositionality.
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I 183
SchifferVsCompositionality: 1. verbs for propositional attitude can hardly be put into a compositional semantics - in addition E.g. -"is a picture of", "true", "big", "toy"(soldier) - adverbs, evaluative terms like - "should", "good", pronouns and demonstrative pronouns - "everyone", "all" - also counterfactual conditional and modal expressions represent a problem for compositional semantics.
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I 183
Compositional truth theoretical semantics/Schiffer: attributes truth conditions to sentences.
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I 184
Compositionality/SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: natural language does not need any compositional semantics for understanding - for new sets, we are not confronted with new words and even only with known constructions - pro Frege: meaning theory must determine compositional mechanisms, but this does not lead to the fact that the meaning theory must be truth-theoretical (must determine truth conditions).
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I 208
SchifferVsCompositionality/SchifferVsFrege: E.g. "and": the everyday linguistic meaning is not captured by the truth value table - compositional semantics would require that there is a non-logical axiom for each non-logical expression - this is not possible - propositions by E, Harveys spoken language receive their representational character via the connection with mental representation - therefore Mentalese does not need compositional semantics.

Schi I
St. Schiffer
Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987


> Counter arguments against Schiffer
> Counter arguments in relation to Compositionality



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25