Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Communication: In general, communication is the transmission of information between several entities (people, animals, cells) that are able to process this information. In communication, information is copied and not merely transmitted, since it is not lost at the original location. New information emerges where applicable in the individuals involved in the communication. The aim of communication is to change the information of a recipient. Human communication also includes the manner of transmission, e.g. ironic coloring of a quotation or the knowledge about the credibility of a source. See also information, language, communication theory, actions, understanding, frame theories.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Donald Davidson on Communication - Dictionary of Arguments

McDowell I 211
Communication/Language/Davidson: there is no "medium" here. Except in the sense of "smoke signals", sounds, etc. Language is at best a match of idiolects.
All understanding is a special case of radical interpretation. >Radical interpretation/Davidson.
"Common Language" is nothing more than the tool of cognitive activity, which could also do without it.
- - -
Glüer II 58
Language/communication/meaning/Davidson/Glüer: there are two possible interpretations of the thesis of "communication without regularity": a strong one and a weak one.
1. strong demand: always use the word "capacity" in the way you want to be understood. Comprehensibility would be bound to following lexical norms.
Davidson: is right: even if Mrs. X uses the word only once in the wrong way, we understand it perfectly. Comprehensibility may be difficult in practice, but theoretically it is not at risk. We cannot formulate a single lexical norm that the speaker must necessarily adhere to.
2. weak: as long as the radical interpretation should ensure the accessibility of the foreign idiolect, it must show a certain weak regularity internally.
DavidsonVs: the radical reading of "A nice derangement", however, denies this weak regularity.
II 59
Problem: the theory of interpretation would lose its empirical character, the concept of statement intention would also remain puzzling. For it is still true that the interpreter has no other data for the determination of intentions than for meanings. They result from the same original interpretation process. "This characterization of linguistic competence is circular enough not to be wrong". (1986).


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Davidson I
D. Davidson
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (a)
Donald Davidson
"Tho Conditions of Thoughts", in: Le Cahier du Collège de Philosophie, Paris 1989, pp. 163-171
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (b)
Donald Davidson
"What is Present to the Mind?" in: J. Brandl/W. Gombocz (eds) The MInd of Donald Davidson, Amsterdam 1989, pp. 3-18
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (c)
Donald Davidson
"Meaning, Truth and Evidence", in: R. Barrett/R. Gibson (eds.) Perspectives on Quine, Cambridge/MA 1990, pp. 68-79
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (d)
Donald Davidson
"Epistemology Externalized", Ms 1989
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson I (e)
Donald Davidson
"The Myth of the Subjective", in: M. Benedikt/R. Burger (eds.) Bewußtsein, Sprache und die Kunst, Wien 1988, pp. 45-54
In
Der Mythos des Subjektiven, , Stuttgart 1993

Davidson II
Donald Davidson
"Reply to Foster"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976

Davidson III
D. Davidson
Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford 1980
German Edition:
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990

Davidson IV
D. Davidson
Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford 1984
German Edition:
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990

Davidson V
Donald Davidson
"Rational Animals", in: D. Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford 2001, pp. 95-105
In
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005

McDowell I
John McDowell
Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996
German Edition:
Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001

McDowell II
John McDowell
"Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism"
In
Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,

D II
K. Glüer
D. Davidson Zur Einführung Hamburg 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2021-06-23
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